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Chapter 5 
Taking the Paris Agreement Forward: Continuous 
Strategic Decision-making on Climate Action by 
the Meeting of the Parties 
Petra Minnerop 
Abstract 
There is a new cloth on the table that provides the setting for global climate action. 
The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement represents the future legal framework designed to 
facilitate global efforts to combat climate change in the long-term. This article looks at 
the fabric of this framework through the lens of the law-making procedure. The law- 
making procedure that brought the Paris Agreement into life and will sustain it, marks 
a departure from the traditional framework convention-cum-protocol approach and 
changes it into a ‘framework convention-cum-decisions’ model. While the Kyoto Proto- 
col was prescriptive in setting individual emission targets for developed countries, the 
Paris Agreement sets forth an evolutionary multilateral treaty and enables Parties to 
steer collective and individual efforts towards a worldwide temperature goal through 
continuous, strategic decision-making. The article demonstrates that the Agreement 
becomes operational only in the context of the decisions that were adopted by the 
Conference of Parties with the Agreement and in the context of further decisions that 
need to be adopted by the ‘Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement’. Many of the skeletal provisions and mechanisms of the Paris 
Agreement need to be fleshed out and operated through further decisions. New func- 
tions and competences conferred on the ‘Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties’ change the role that this meeting of the Parties has, making it the driver 
for the development of the law on combating climate change. This international law- 
making is reinforced through the integration of Parties’ decisions within legal orders of 
Parties, the European Union legal order will be used as an example of one legal order 
acting as a transmission belt. The article contends that this strategic decision-making 
affects the legal certainty of international climate action and contravenes the balance 
between legislative approval of an international agreement and the prerogative of na- 
tional governments for strategic decisions. 
Accepted Manuscript Version of Minnerop, Petra. "Taking the Paris Agreement forward: 
Continuous strategic decision-making on Climate Action by the Meeting of the Parties". 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law. 2018. 21.
Final version available via DOI: 10.1163/13894633_021001006
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i Introduction 
The world’s future climate depends on whether the Paris Agreement, the new 
cloth on the negotiating table between Parties, maintains the power to gather 
Parties together in the future and to connect Parties more than it separates 
them.1 With its 195 signatories and 178 Parties, the Paris Agreement (in the fol- 
lowing also ‘the Agreement’) is truly universal.2 Following the decision of the 
United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement which is not the formal 
notification of withdrawal as required by the Paris Agreement,3 the European 
Council confirmed that from the European perspective, the Agreement re- 
mains a cornerstone of global efforts to effectively tackle climate change and 
excluded renegotiating the Agreement.4 This view was also declared by leaders 
at the 2017 G20 Summit.5 
 
 
 
1 For the working principles of the Public Realm, see H. Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd ed 
University of Chicago Press 1998) 53. 
2 Paris Agreement 2015 (done 22 April 2016, entered into force 4 November 2016) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. As of 13 June 2018, 178 Parties have ratified the Agreement, of 197 
Parties to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) (signed 4 June 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 unts 107. 
3 See {  HYPERLINK "http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-
newsroom/unfccc-statement-on-the-us-decision-to-withdraw-from-
paris-agreement" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/unfccc-statement-on-
the-us-decision-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement" \h } (last visited 28 
September 2017). Art. 28 of the Agreement stipulates that a Party may withdraw from the 
Agreement any time after three years from the date on which the Agreement has entered 
into force for that Party. The withdrawal shall then take effect upon expiry of one year from 
the date of receipt by the depositary of the notifica- tion of withdrawal. 
4 European Council Conclusions on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 22 June 2017, 
available  at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/06/22/euco-paris-agreement" \h } 
{ HYPERLINK "http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/06/22/euco-paris-agreement" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018). 
5 Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration, G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for 
Growth, at 1, contains the reference that ‘The United States is currently in the process of 
reviewing many of its policies related to climate change and continues to reserve its posi- 
tion on this document and its contents, available at {  HYPERLINK 
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"https://www.g20germany.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2017-
g20-climate-and-energy-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6" \h 
} {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.g20germany.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2017-
g20-climate-and-energy-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=6" \h 
} (last visited 7 June 2018).  Please check the unpaired quotation mark in the sentence “1, contains the reference…”. 
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The literature on the Agreement is already rich, providing analysis of the le- 
gal status and architecture of its provisions, the context of the negotiating his- 
tory, and the potential of the Agreement to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (ghg) emissions.6 As such, the objective of this article is to scrutinize the 
fabric of the new cloth and to focus on the innovative method of international 
law-making that both the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision, with which 
the Paris Agreement was adopted by the Conference of Parties in Paris, rep- 
resent. Technically, the Paris Agreement is included as Annex to the Paris De- 
cision.7 Yet as Laurence Boisson de Chazournes remarks they are almost like 
‘Siamese twins’, thus ‘when one refers to the Paris Agreement, it should be con- 
sidered alongside the Decision’.8 Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to 
this new phenomenon of law-creation under a framework-cum-decisions ap- 
proach so far. This article fills this gap and explores how the Conference of Par- 
ties (cop) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(unfccc), and even more the newly created ‘Conference of Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement’ (cma)9 might operate in 
this venture to develop and enhance future legal action on the climate. 
Multilateral environmental treaties regularly rely on the decision-making 
power of ‘Conferences of Parties’ or ‘Meetings of Parties’ as engines for the 
development of treaties, especially for the incorporation of latest scientific 
 
6 See D. Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 reciel 142; D. Bo- 
dansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A new hope?’ (2016) 110 ajil 288; R. Falkner, 
‘The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics’ (2016) 92 Interna- 
tional Affairs 1107; D. Klein et al. (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Commentary 
and Analysis (oup 2017); M. Gervasi, ‘Rilievi critici sull’Accordo di Parigi. Le sue potenzialità 
e il suo ruolo nell’evoluzione dell’azione internazionale di contrasto al cambiamento cli- 
matico’ (2016) 71 La Communità Internazionale 21; A. Huszár, ‘Preliminary Legal Issues in 
the Historic Paris Climate Agreement’ (2016) Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and 
European Law 195; L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: 
Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 iclq 493; L. Rajamani, ‘The 2015 
Paris Agreement: Interplay between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’ (2016) 28 jel 337. Fur- 
ther references throughout this article. 
7 
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Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015: Addendum Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its Twenty-first Session: Decision 1/CP.21 ‘Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement’ (29 January 2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. The Paris Decision is structured into 
six subsections and consists of 139 paragraphs. 
8 L.B. De Chazournes, ‘One Swallow Does Not a Summer Make, but Might the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change a Better Future Create?’ (2016) 27 ejil 253, 254. 
9 This is the officially used abbreviation for the ‘Conference of Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement’. ‘cop’ stands for the unfccc Conference of Parties 
and ‘cmp’ stands for the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
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Taking the Paris Agreement Forward 127 
evidence, and for the provision of guidance on coherent implementation, with 
a varying degree of legally binding force.10 Parties’ decisions on these matters 
tend to be firmly anchored in State consent, and instances where States accept 
to be bound by stricter rules adopted by a qualified majority vote, are rare.11 
Yet the Paris Agreement follows a distinctly different path. The functions 
and pertinent competences assigned to the cma under the Paris Agreement 
and the Paris Decision go substantially beyond the traditional role of a Parties’ 
Conference. Unsurmountable negotiating issues at the Paris conference have 
not been excluded to be then resolved in an additional protocol or amend- 
ment. They have been assigned to further strategic cma decisions. As much 
of the Paris Agreement’s provisions remain non-operational, the cma becomes 
the key driver in the future development of climate change rules. This makes 
the cma autonomous in the process of continuous decision-making and ren- 
ders future treaty-making or amendment procedures superfluous.12 
With issues such as differentiation under the new Agreement, the inclusion 
of a long-term temperature goal and dynamism, finance, and loss and damage 
being unresolved up until the conference in Paris in 2015,13 the new approach 
of Parties’ continuous strategic decision-making is ostensibly motivated and 
 
 
10 For a discussion in the literature see J. Brunnée, ‘coping with Consent: Law-making under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 ljil 1; R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, 
‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A 
Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 ajil 623; V. Röben, ‘Confer- 
ence (Meeting) of States Parties’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (oup 2008–), available at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.mpepil.com/" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018); for a discussion of the 
development of a new layer of regulatory international law see 
J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legiti- 
macy’ (2004) 64 ZaöRV 547, at 559. 
11 The well-known example, the Montreal Protocol of Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, allows adjustments and hence a tightening of obligations, once a chemical is sub- 
ject to the control mechanism. In an important move to protect the global climate, Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol agreed in Kigali in 2016 on new binding targets and timetables to 
phase down harmful hydrofluorocarbons, in accordance with the Protocol’s amendment 
procedure. Art. 9 (4) Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (adopted 
22 March 1985, entered into force 22 September 1988) 1513 unts 324; Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into 
force 1 January 1989) 1522 unts 3; Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (done 23 
November 2016) C.N.872.2016.TREATIES-XXVII.2.f. 
12 The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Paris Agreement (cma 1) took place in Marrakech, Morocco from 15–18 November 
2016, the second and third session of cma 1 will take place in 2017 and 2018 respectively. 
13 See European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies ‘International Climate 
Negotiations – On the Road to Paris – Issues at Stake in View of cop 21’ (2015) 43. 
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underpinned by the pursuit of efficacy and practicality for many Parties.14 The 
concern not to introduce too many new and substantial topics into the Agree- 
ment, but to leave these for the Paris Decision, also played an important role.15 
Yet this particular extent of decision-making in conjunction with an interna- 
tional agreement and the prospect of continuous decision-making entails sev- 
eral consequences. First, leaving major substantial issues for Parties’ decisions 
outside the international treaty, diminishes the role of the treaty as a form of 
international legislation. Second, decisions taken exclusively in the forum of a 
Parties’ conference or meeting lose their potential for entrenchment through 
treaty law. Third, for many constitutional States, the fact that decision-making 
processes gravitate towards Parties’ conferences or meetings challenges do- 
mestic ratification avenues. All three aspects will ultimately be relevant for the 
contribution and efficiency of international law in the field of climate change. 
Recently published studies in the field of environmental science and civil 
engineering on different scenarios of global warming confirm that only if the 
long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement is reached, will parts of 
the world such as North-India, Pakistan and Bangladesh remain habitable.16 A 
business-as-usual scenario of atmospheric ghg concentrations risks human 
survivability and if emissions are not reduced significantly, large parts of South 
Asia could become too hot and humid for humans, resulting in the inevitable 
risk of mass migration. To make the Paris Agreement deliver the change need- 
ed to reduce the impact of climate change, its further concretization through 
 
14 The EU position was to adopt ‘a comprehensive package of substantive decisions, in ad- 
dition to a technical work programme, at the Paris Conference to further develop rules, 
modalities and procedures on inter alia transparency and accountability of mitigation 
commitments, including for the land-use sector, and on the international use of markets, 
to be completed by 2017, to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement’, Council 
of the European Union (18 September 2015) 12165/15, para. 19. 
15 Position of the United States in accordance with the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 1997, see 
S.Res.98 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for 
the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse 
gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
agreed with 95 votes in favour and no vote against it, S. Rept. 105–54; and with the same 
wording, H.Res.211 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the 
conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on 
greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 105th Congress (1997–1998), available at {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-
resolution/98" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-
resolution/98" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018). 
16 E.S. Im, J.S. Pal and E.A.B. Eltahir, ‘Deadly Heat Waves Projected in the Densely Populated 
Agricultural Regions of South Asia’ (2017) 3 Science Advances 8, available at { 
HYPERLINK 
"http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/3/8/e1603322.full
.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
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Taking the Paris Agreement Forward 129 
cma decisions, especially law-making decisions, must not only be certain and 
efficient but also accepted widely and in the long term by all its Parties, stake- 
holders and of course, the public. 
This article makes four main arguments. First, the cma is endowed with 
two interlocking functions, on the footing of the Paris Agreement and the Paris 
Decision: to exercise oversight over Parties’ efforts and to steer their conduct 
towards a common goal. Each of these functions will be fulfilled through stra- 
tegic decisions of the cma, based on competences assigned to it. Second, these 
cma decisions can be legally binding on Parties, in accordance with interna- 
tional law. This concerns the inner-systemic aspect of taking the Agreement 
forward through infra-treaty law. Third, cma decisions also have an external ef- 
fect.17 These external consequences go beyond the multifaceted influence that 
action in an international forum may generally have on national administra- 
tions. Strategic cma decisions cause the need for further legal action outside 
the international legal regime. This perpetuates the impact of strategic cma 
decisions. The European Union legal order, with the proposed governance of 
the European Energy Union, exemplifies this. Fourth, continuous strategic 
decision-making of the cma has implications for aspects of legal certainty 
and legitimacy of law-making under the Paris Agreement. 
The article is structured as follows: the following Part ii starts with a discus- 
sion of the oversight function of the cma under the Agreement. It first focuses 
on how the Agreement bridges the gap between the bottom-up approach, self- 
perception by Parties, and the global stocktake procedure. It demonstrates that 
the cma gains significant control over nationally determined contributions 
as the foundation of mitigation efforts through this procedure and that it has 
the competence to decide to adjust the overall target within the given margin 
of 1.5°C and 2°C. The part then turns to the function of the cma in steering 
Parties’ conduct through its assigned competences in relation to adaptation, 
finance, compensation and compliance. 
Part iii scrutinizes the legal consequences that cma decision-making may 
have. It first explains the legal implications of whether a decision is adopted 
under the unfccc by the ‘Conference of Parties’ (cop), under the Kyoto Pro- 
tocol by the ‘Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol’ (cmp) or under the Paris Agreement by the cma. The com- 
position of these groups of Parties varies, for instance the United States will 
remain part of the cop, but not of the cma, once withdrawal from the Paris 
 
17 See for the distinction between the internal and external sphere J.E. Alvarez, International 
Organizations as Law-makers (oup 2006) 120. 
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Agreement becomes effective.18 It also matters in relation to the legal conse- 
quences of decisions of Parties, for questions such as compliance of a Party 
with assigned emission allowances. This part then sets out general criteria for 
the qualification of cma decisions as legally binding in international law. 
Part iv examines the external sphere, using as reference the influence of 
cma decision-making on the governance of the European Energy Union as 
contained in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council of November 2016.19 
Part v explores the consequences that law-making through decisions will 
have on the traditional differentiation between a law-making treaty and sub- 
sequent implementing decisions, under the aspect of legal certainty of inter- 
national action to protect the climate. It also identifies the closely related yet 
distinct question of legitimacy that arises from this new approach of inter- 
national regulation. It highlights that extensive decision-making by Parties 
through the cma requires a re-thinking of the delicate balance between the 
prerogative of national governments and the participation of national parlia- 
ments in international  decision-making. 
The conclusions in Part vi summarize the findings. 
 
ii Interlocking Functions of the cma: Exercising Oversight and 
Steering Conduct 
For the first time in international climate action, the Paris Agreement spells 
out in its Art. 2 (1) (a) a temperature objective to enhance the implementa- 
tion of the unfccc. It aims at ‘holding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue ef- 
forts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of cli- 
mate change’. To achieve this temperature goal, the Agreement combines Par- 
ties’ self-perception (1.) with interlocking functions of the cma, to exercise 
 
 
18 Art. 28 of the Agreement stipulates that a Party may withdraw from the Agreement any 
time after three years from the date on which the Agreement has entered into force for 
that Party. The withdrawal shall then take effect upon expiry of one year from the date 
of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal. Up to that time, a Party 
remains obligated to fully comply with the Agreement, Art. 70 (1) (a) Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
unts 331. 
19 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Gover- 
nance of the Energy Union, com(2016) 759 final. 
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Taking the Paris Agreement Forward 131 
oversight through the global stocktake (2.) and through transparency (3.) and 
to develop mechanisms to steer Parties’ conduct (4.). 
1 The Bottom-up Approach for Mitigation, Progression and Limits 
of Self-perception 
The Agreement trusts in contributions by all Parties. In accordance with the 
decision 1/CP.20, Parties to the unfccc had submitted so called ‘intended 
nationally determined contributions’ (indcs) to demonstrate their plans for 
post-2020 climate action.20 Following up on these initial pledges, each Party 
shall prepare, communicate and maintain a ‘nationally determined contribu- 
tion’ (ndc) every five years, Art. 4 (2) Paris Agreement. In June 2018, 172 Parties 
had submitted their first ndcs.21 Domestic mitigation shall be pursued with 
the aim to achieve the objective of such contributions, Art. 4 (2) sentence 2. 
As Daniel Bodansky explains, this does not necessarily mean that each Party 
is required to implement the ndc, as the point of reference is the objective of 
such contribution, not the contribution itself.22 In fact, this pinpoints that the 
provision of the Agreement, read on its own, does not specify what is expected 
from Parties. Even though it is framed as a legally binding rule, the objective of 
the ndc as the benchmark for mitigation efforts remains vague. 
Much will depend on how the cma will define the necessary elements of an 
ndc. Neither the Agreement nor the Paris Decision define the exact content 
that an ndc should have. Instead, the Agreement addresses the importance 
of cma decisions for defining relevant information to be submitted by Parties 
with their pledges. In communicating their ndcs, ‘all Parties shall provide the 
information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accor- 
dance with Decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant cma decision’, Art. 4 (8). The Paris 
Decision identifies information that Parties may include, as appropriate, such 
as quantifiable information on the reference point, time frames and method- 
ological approaches and assigns the competence to the cma to adopt guidance 
to further facilitate the clarity, transparency and understanding of ndcs.23 The 
 
 
 
20 They were available at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/focus/items/10240.php" \h } (last visited 16 October 
2017), no longer available online as of June 2018. 
21 Available at { HYPERLINK "http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx" \h }(last 
visited 7 June 2018). 
22 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 reciel 142, at 146. 
23 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, paras 27, 28. See also the views 
expressed by Parties at the resumed first session May 2017, Informal Note by the Co- 
Facilitators Agenda item 3 – Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of 
decision 1/CP.21, available at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/apa/application/pdf/cofacilitators_note
_1_apa_3_15052017_for_publication.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/apa/application/pdf/cofacilitators_note
_1_apa_3_15052017_for_publication.pdf" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018). 
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cma also has the mandate to adopt ‘guidance on features’ of ndcs.24 The Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (apa) is to develop both sets of 
guidance, to be then adopted at the first session of the cma.25 Whether the 
guidance will be legally binding or just a strong recommendation, depends on 
the exact wording and cannot be extrapolated from the meaning of the word 
‘guidance’ as such. The cma could adopt legally binding guidance on features 
that clarify the content of the ndc, such as the contribution that the Party 
intends to achieve, the relevant timeframe, the policy and legal framework.26 
It is likely that this guidance will narrow the leeway for interpretation of the 
rule that mitigation efforts shall be pursued with the aim to achieve the objec- 
tive of the ndc, so that it will become rather difficult for Parties to justify a sce- 
nario where mitigation measures are not designed to implement their ndcs. 
For Parties whose ndcs contain absolute ghg emission targets, a differentia- 
tion between implementing the objective of their ndc and the ndc itself may 
already prove to be impossible.27 
The Paris Agreement demands ambition and claims that each successive 
contribution ‘will represent a progression’, Art. 4 (3), and each Party may at any 
time adjust its contribution to enhance its level of ambition, Art. 4 (11). Two dif- 
ferent approaches are established to ensure that successive ndcs will be more 
ambitious than the previous ndc: a normative expectation of progression and 
the global stocktake as collective oversight mechanism, in which the cma will 
play a major role. 
First, the Agreement lays down a normative expectation against which a 
backsliding or a pledge below the economic capabilities of States will be ex- 
tremely difficult to justify. The expectation is that the ambition for each ndc 
 
24 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 26. 
25 Decision 1/CMA.1, Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, UN 
Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2016/3/Add.1, 5: ‘third part of the first session of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to be convened in 
conjunction with the twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties (December 
2018)’. 
26 See for instance, Canada’s Submission on apa Item 3 Features, up-front information & 
accounting for Nationally Determined Contributions, available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/
175_279_131196434376977581-APA%20Item%203%20-
%20Canada%20English%20-%20NDCs%20-
%20Sept%2027%202016.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/
175_279_131196434376977581-APA%20Item%203%20-
%20Canada%20English%20-%20NDCs%20-
%20Sept%2027%202016.pdf" \h }  {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/
175_279_131196434376977581-APA%20Item%203%20-
%20Canada%20English%20-%20NDCs%20-
%20Sept%2027%202016.pdf" \h } (last visited 4 June 2018). 
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27 This is the case for the EU (binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in green- 
house gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990); Australia submitted an economy-wide 
ghg emission reduction target; China announced that by 2020 it will lower carbon di- 
oxide emissions per unit of gdp by 40% to 45% from the 2005 level, increase the share 
of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to about 15%, available at the Interim 
Registry, {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx" \h } (last visited 4 
June 2018). 
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will increase with each successive ndc and that it will reflect the highest 
possible ambition. Progression in the Agreement could be qualified as a new 
principle of ‘non-regression – never below the target, always above’, or it could 
even be read as a new principle of progression.28 The expectation of progres- 
sion is related to two parameters: time and improved capacities. Progression 
over time aims at accelerating ambition just because time has progressed. 
Once a ndc has been made, one could argue that a Party is legally obliged 
to improve upon this. However, progression in relation to improved capaci- 
ties will remain rather difficult to confine. The Paris Agreement employs the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in a slightly nuanced 
fashion and allows Parties to determine their progression ‘in the light of na- 
tional circumstances’.29 This is a dynamic reference that underlines the nor- 
mative expectation that contributions will rise in accordance with improved 
national circumstances. However, there is no definition of the term ‘different 
national circumstances’. Some clarity on the direction of Parties’ progression 
can be derived from the still applicable developed country Parties/develop- 
ing country Parties divide. For developed country Parties, the objective is that 
they ‘should take the lead in undertaking economy-wide absolute emission 
reduction targets’.30 The term ‘shall’ of an earlier draft31 was replaced by the 
expression ‘should’ at the last minute as a response to the strong resistance of 
the United States to make it a binding obligation.32 Developing country Parties 
are only expected to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduc- 
tion targets. Some pressure on all Parties will be exerted through the transpar- 
ency of the public register, where all ndcs will be recorded. Modalities for its 
 
28 L.B. De Chazournes, ‘One Swallow Does Not a Summer Make, but Might the Paris Agree- 
ment on Climate Change a Better Future Create?’ (2016) 27 ejil 253, at 254. 
29 Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Art. 2 (2); Art. 4 (3). 
It represents a compromise between China and the US, see L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and 
Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying 
Politics’ (2016) 65 iclq 493, 508. 
30 The principle that developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof is already established in Art. 3 (1) of the unfccc. 
31 ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Proposal by the President’ (12 December 2015) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9. 
32 Byrd-Hagel Resolution 1997, S.Res.98. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate re- 
garding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international 
agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Conven- 
tion on Climate Change, agreed with 95 votes in favour and no vote against it, S. Rept. 105– 
54, available at { HYPERLINK "https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-
congress/senate-resolution/98" \h } (last visited 7 June 2018). A new 
international agreement on climate change can only produce binding commitments for 
the United States if major developing countries are included and U.S. competitiveness 
is not adversely influenced by the international agreement. 
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operation will be adopted by the cma, in accordance with the Paris Decision.33 
This transparency is employed as means to influence ambition, since action or 
inaction of a Party will be visible and bound to affect other Parties.34 Any in- 
crease in ambition by a Party eases the pressure for the community of Parties. 
Indeed, Parties have already proven to be prepared to take on more ambitious 
targets if they can expect with a degree of certainty that other Parties adhere 
to equally ambitious contribution commitments.35 
In a second move, and to win back more effective control over nationally 
perceived ambition capacities, the Agreement does not rely upon this norma- 
tive expectation alone. Rather, the overall progress in achieving the tempera- 
ture goal, increasing the ability to adapt to adverse effects of climate change 
and making finance flows consistent, will be assessed in a dedicated global 
stocktake procedure. 
2 The Global Stocktake: Can the cma Improve Ambition? 
Art. 14 (1) of the Agreement tasks the cma to periodically take stock of the 
implementation of the Agreement. The cma has far-reaching competences 
concerning the timeframe, starting date, input and outcome of the global 
stocktake. The process is designed to assess the collective progress of Parties 
towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals. The 
aim is not to review the contribution of a single State. Under consideration are 
mitigation and adaptation efforts and ‘the means of implementation and sup- 
port in the light of equity and the best available science’, Art. 14 (1). According 
to the Agreement, the first global stocktake shall be undertaken in 2023 and 
every five years thereafter, if not otherwise decided by the cma, Art. 14 (2). The 
outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhanc- 
ing their ndcs, Art. 14 (3) of the Agreement. Thus, the global stocktake comes 
full circle: not only will all ndcs be assessed by the cma in the global stocktak- 
ing, the outcome of the global stocktake shall also inform Parties in updating 
and enhancing their contributions. 
There are two points worthy of mention in relation to the timeframe of the 
global stocktake. First, the Paris Decision assigns competence to the cma to 
adjust the periodic time frame. Second, the Paris Decision indicates an earlier 
 
33 Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, paras 29, 30. 
34 P. Sands, ‘Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International 
Law’ (2016) 28 ejil 19, at 22. 
35 See for instance the pledges made by countries like Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein 
and the EU, Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Art. 1: Amendment A. Annex B to the 
Kyoto Protocol, n 7, 9, 10, 11. Available at {  HYPERLINK 
"https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2012/CN.718.2012-
Eng.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2012/CN.718.2012-
Eng.pdf" \h }(last visited 2 June 2018). 
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beginning of the global stocktake than the Paris Agreement, with a view to 
start a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collec- 
tive efforts in relation to the long-term temperature goal, and to inform the 
preparation of ndcs.36 As part of this facilitative dialogue, the implementa- 
tion efforts of developed country Parties regarding their quantified economy- 
wide emission reduction target under the Convention and, if also a Party to the 
Kyoto Protocol, its quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment 
for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, will be conducted 
with a view to identifying ways to enhance ambition in mitigation by all Par- 
ties.37 This will be accompanied by a special report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (ipcc)38 in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global ghg emissions pathways.39 
Parties whose ndcs contain a timeframe beyond 2020, are then required to 
update their contributions in 2020 and five yearly afterwards.40 
How exactly the global stocktake will inform future ndcs is not specified 
in the Agreement. In the Paris Decision, however, the cop gives detailed guid- 
ance for developing the global stocktake procedure further, through endowing 
the cma with the competence to decide on ‘sources of input’41 and modalities 
of the global stocktake.42 Scientific assessments of the ipcc also inform the 
global stocktake.43 The cop has already expressed its concern in the Paris De- 
cision that the estimated aggregated emission levels for 2025 and 2030, based 
on pledges so far, do not fall within the least-cost 2°C scenario, not to men- 
tion the most ambitious 1.5°C target.44 What are the potential consequences 
of such a conclusion? How can the cma respond under the Agreement and the 
 
36 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 20. 
37 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 115, referring to 1/CP.19, paras 3 and 4, see FCCC/CP/2013/10/ 
Add.1. 
38 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) assesses and reports on the sci- 
entific basis of climate change. It advances the scientific knowledge on climate change. 
ipcc Reports are extremely relevant for policy development but not prescriptive. 
39 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, paras 20, 21. 
40 Paris Decision, ibid., paras 23, 24. 
41 ‘Including, but not limited to: (a) Information on: (i) The overall effect of the nationally 
determined contributions communicated by Parties; (ii) The state of adaptation efforts, 
support, experiences and priorities from the communications referred to in Art. 7, paras 
10 and 11, of the Agreement, and reports referred to in Art. 13, para. 8, of the Agreement; 
(iii) The mobilization and provision of support; (b) The latest reports of the Intergovern- 
mental Panel on Climate Change; (c) Reports of the subsidiary bodies’, Paris Decision, 
ibid., para. 99. 
42 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 101. 
43 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 100. 
44 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 17. 
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Paris Decision? The cma could inform Parties in the facilitative dialogue, even 
before 2020, that the nationally determined contributions are not ambitious 
enough. Furthermore, the cma might even indicate that, in accordance with 
scientific evidence, the temperature goal within a scope of 0.5°C, between 
1.5°C and 2°C should be adjusted, to drive greater ambition.45 The competence 
of the cma to do so can be found in Art. 2 (2) of the Agreement, in conjunc- 
tion with Art. 14 (3), given the fact that the Agreement sets out a temperature 
range, and the role of the cma in enhancing contributions. Even though the 
Agreement adopts a bottom-up approach, the cma has the power through the 
global stocktake to inform Parties that their collective efforts are not sufficient 
to reach the upper limit of the temperature – objective that the Agreement 
sets forth, let alone the lower and more aspirational goal of 1.5°C.46 From a le- 
gal point of view, the cma has the competence to adjust the temperature goal 
as the point of reference for the global stocktake, without the need of a fur- 
ther formal treaty amendment. It is a completely different question, however, 
whether the cma will also have the political commitment, to do so. 
3 Controlling National Implementation through the Transparency 
Framework 
While the global stocktake aims at controlling collective progress towards 
achieving the purpose and the long-term goals of the Agreement, the en- 
hanced transparency framework is more concerned with tracking progress 
towards achieving Parties’ individual ndcs. The transparency framework has 
reporting obligations for all Parties at its heart, Art. 13 (1) Paris Agreement. Its 
concrete shape and especially the important decision on provision of flexibil- 
ity for some Parties lies largely in the hands of the cma. 
The Agreement abandons the differentiation of reporting requirements on 
mitigation efforts for developed and developing countries in favour of a ro- 
bust ‘one size fits all’ approach, with general flexibility only allowed for those 
 
45 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 21: ‘Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to 
provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above, pre- 
industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways’. The ipcc an- 
nounced on 21 September 2017 that the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C will 
be released in early October 2018, available at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/ST-
clarifying_IPCC_role_1.5C.shtml" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/ST-
clarifying_IPCC_role_1.5C.shtml" \h }(last visited 6 June 2018); see also the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, com 
(2016) 110 final, at 3: ‘The aspirational goal of 1.5°C was agreed to drive greater 
ambition’. 
46 The estimated aggregate annual global emission levels resulting from implementing 
the initial indcs would in accordance with a report of the Secretariat not fall within the 
least-cost 2°C scenarios by 2025 and 2030, Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the 
intended nationally determined contributions, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/7, Figure 2 and 
para. 39. 
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developing country Parties that need it, Art. 13 (2). The purpose of the frame- 
work is to understand climate change action towards achieving the purpose of 
Art. 2 unfccc, Art. 4 Paris Agreement and to track progress towards achieving 
Parties’ ndcs, Art. 13 (5). Information should be submitted regularly and de- 
signed to inform the global stocktake. The rather important term ‘regularly’ is 
not defined in the Agreement but further clarified in the Paris Decision. Except 
for the least developed country Parties and small island developing States, it 
means that information shall be submitted not less frequently than biennial- 
ly.47 All Parties must submit their national inventory report of ghg emissions 
and removals and provide information necessary to track progress in relation 
to their ndc, Art. 13 (7). Reporting on financial support also obliges developed 
country Parties to communicate biennially indicative and qualitative informa- 
tion on projected levels of public financial resources, technology and capacity 
building support, aimed at supporting developing country Parties, Art. 13 (9), 
Art. 9 (5). The cma has the competence to strengthen this requirement, as it will 
decide on further details of information on the provision of financial support.48 
All reports will undergo the same Expert Review, Art. 13 (11) as does the in- 
formation submitted by developed country Parties on financial support, tech- 
nology transfer and capacity building provided to developing country Parties, 
Art. 13 (9), (11). Each Party is also under the obligation to participate in a fa- 
cilitative, multilateral consideration of progress, in relation to the provision of 
financial support and the achievement of its ndc, Art. 13 (11). 
One major issue is that the definition of ‘flexibility’ in relation to the obliga- 
tion of reporting for developing country Parties is not clarified in the Agree- 
ment. This will be decided by the cma. The Paris Decision defines that the least 
developed country Parties and small island developing States are exempted 
from the biennial reporting timeframe.49 However, for Parties that are part of 
 
 
47 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 90. Small Island Develop- 
ing States (sids) are a coalition of low-lying islands with a vulnerability to sea-level rise. 
Developing Countries, including China and India, had argued for a continuation of the 
differentiation reporting system, that places stricter requirements on developed country 
Parties, but developed country Parties, mainly the EU and the Umbrella Group succeed- 
ed with their proposal for a uniform transparency framework. The Umbrella Group was 
formed after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and consists normally (no formal mem- 
bership) of Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States. 
48 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 55. 
49 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 90. Developing Countries, including Chinaand India, hadargued 
for acontinuationof the differentiation reporting system, thatplaces stricter requirements 
on developed country Parties, but developed country Parties, such as the United States and 
the EUwiththe Umbrella Group, succeededwiththeirproposalforauniformtransparency 
framework. 
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the group of developing country Parties, but not included in the group of least- 
developed country Parties and small islands States, flexibility may also involve 
a different frequency of reporting. The Paris Decision provides that flexibility 
shall be provided in relation to ‘scope, frequency and level of detail of report- 
ing, and in the scope of review’.50 Flexibility in relation to the scope of review 
is then further specified in the Paris Decision. It could imply that in-country 
reviews remain optional for developing country Parties. The operation of these 
flexibilities depends on how flexibility will be reflected in the modalities, pro- 
cedures and guidelines for reporting, that will be adopted in a decision of the 
cma.51 One option could be to establish tiered reporting requirements, with a 
varying degree of stringency, depending on Parties’ capacities.52 
Reporting on any progress of implementation efforts requires accurate, 
comparable and consistent accounting for Parties’ ndcs, Art. 4 (13). The Agree- 
ment’s approach to accounting corresponds with reporting obligations and, 
as such, marks a departure from the Convention’s differentiation between de- 
veloping and developed country Parties. The Paris Decision contains detailed 
information on the accounting of nationally determined contributions. This 
comprises the expectation to strive to include all categories of anthropogenic 
emissions or removals in their nationally determined contributions and, once 
a source, sink or activity is included, continue to include it, and to provide 
an explanation of why any categories are excluded.53 The Paris decision con- 
fers the competence to decide on accounting guidance on the cma. Future 
guidance on accounting will be drawn from existing approaches and thus be 
closely linked with relevant guidelines.54 Whether this guidance will be legal- 
ly binding or a strong recommendation, remains to be seen. The Agreement 
leaves this decision to the cma.55 
 
50 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 89. 
51 Paris Decision, ibid., paras 89 and 91. 
52 J. Huang, and A. Mansell, ‘Key Issues in Completing the Paris Climate Architecture’ (Cen- 
ter for Climate and Energy Solutions 2016), available at {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/key-issues-completing-paris-
climate-archetecture.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/key-issues-completing-paris-
climate-archetecture.pdf" \h } (last visited 29 September 2017). 
53 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 31 (c), (d). 
54 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 31: ‘Requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agree- 
ment to elaborate, drawing from approaches established under the Convention and its 
related instruments, as appropriate, guidance for accounting for Parties’ nationally deter- 
mined contributions…’. 
55 L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative 
Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 iclq 493, 499, remarks that ‘much will 
depend on the terms – mandatory or discretionary – in which the decision is drafted’. 
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4 Steering Conduct and the Role of the cma in Designing Mechanisms 
The second function of the cma is to steer the actual conduct of Parties. To this 
effect, the cma will adopt decisions on adaptation, compensation, financial 
support and compliance procedure. 
a Adaptation 
The Paris Agreements acknowledges that adaptation is a global challenge 
faced by all, while emphasizing that it is an immediate and major priority for 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse ef- 
fects of climate change, Art. 7 (2). Parties have recognized that greater levels of 
mitigation contribute to lowering adaptation needs, Art. 7 (4). As part of the 
global stocktake, adaptation efforts will be reviewed, Art. 7 (14). This includes 
recognizing adaptation efforts of developing country Parties, Art. 7 (14) (a). In 
addition, adaptation action as reported in the respective communication will 
be enhanced, Art. 7 (14) (b) and the effectiveness of the support that is pro- 
vided for adaption will be reviewed, Art. 7 (14) (c). 
While the Agreement sets out the framework on adaptation, the develop- 
ment of further details on the review process fall within the competence of 
the cma. Modalities for the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing 
country Parties will be adopted by the cma.56 The cma will also adopt meth- 
odologies for assessing adaptation needs of developing country Parties.57 The 
Paris Agreement does not specify any details on the facilitation of support that 
is provided for developing country Parties. The Paris Decision assigns the com- 
petence to the cma to decide on methodologies on ‘taking the necessary steps 
to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries 
in the context of the limit to global average temperature increase referred to 
in Art. 2 of the Agreement’.58 This is a broad mandate concerning the distribu- 
tion of support. It may include a further decision on how support is provided, 
how much and to which Party. In relation to the reference ‘in the context of 
the global average temperature increase’, it remains unclear, whether the lower 
or the upper limit of the temperature range given in Art. 2 of the Agreement 
marks the relevant standard. 
When reviewing the overall progress on adaptation in the global stocktake, 
the cma could decide whether the support provided is sufficient, and whether 
it is effectively used. 
 
56 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 41. 
57 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 42 (b). 
58 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 45 (a). 
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b Finance 
Minnerop 
The Paris Agreement does not include a quantified goal on finance. Parties 
made provision for this in the Paris Decision instead, and they also endowed 
the cma with the competence to set a new quantified goal based on the exist- 
ing one prior to 2025. 
The provision on finance reiterates the fact that mitigation and adaptation 
are the main fundaments of future climate actions. It states that developed 
country Parties shall provide financial resources for developing country Parties 
with respect to both, mitigation and adaptation, Art. 9 (1) Paris Agreement. 
The financial mechanism under the unfccc shall also serve as the financial 
mechanism of the Agreement, Art. 9 (8).59 The Agreement extends the circle 
of contributors, in adding to the existing obligation of developed country Par- 
ties the voluntary contribution of other Parties, who are also encouraged to 
provide support, Art. 9 (2). 
As already mentioned in relation to mitigation and adaptation, the Agree- 
ment adds a new reliance on progression of States overall60 which manifests 
itself in various provisions,61 each being conducive to promoting the global 
climate goal. In a similar vein, this applies to the provision of financial support 
to developing countries. The mobilization of climate finance funds should rep- 
resent progression of efforts in accordance with Art. 9 (3). Developing country 
Parties should receive scaled up financial resources with the aim to balance 
mitigation and adaptation efforts, Art. 9 (4). Yet further specification on con- 
crete amounts is given only in the Paris Decision.62 The target for developed 
country Parties is set to jointly providing US$100 billion annually through to 
2025.63 A new collective quantified goal starting with a baseline of US$100 bil- 
lion a year, that takes the needs and priorities of developing countries into 
account, is to be identified by the cma prior to 2025. 
The Agreement uses mandatory language when requiring developed coun- 
try Parties to provide biennially64 information on their provision of predictive 
 
 
59 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 58. 
60 Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Art. 3, 2nd sentence 
‘The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time…’, and Art. 4 paragraph 19 
envisages long-term greenhouse gas emission development strategies. 
61 Paris Agreement, ibid., Art. 4 (3), (4), Art. 9 (3). 
62 To move this into the decisions mark a compromise between developing and developed 
country Parties, L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: 
Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 iclq 493, at 512. 
63 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, paras 53 and 114. 
64 It is worth to mention that the timeframe for the fulfilment of all other informational 
requirements was decided outside the Agreement, see Paris Decision, ibid., para. 90. 
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funding through giving indicative quantitative and qualitative details which 
will then be considered in the global stocktake, Art. 9 (5), (6). Informational 
requirements for Parties who are not legally required to contribute to financial 
support, remain non-mandatory. The Agreement does not prescribe clearly 
which information developed country Parties must submit to ensure that fi- 
nance flows are predictable for developing country Parties. The Paris Decision 
clarifies that financial resources provided by developed country Parties must 
enable climate change actions of developing country Parties for mitigation 
and adaptation efforts that contribute to the achievement of the purpose of 
the Agreement as defined in Art. 2.65 The cma has the competence to iden- 
tify and decide which information will be necessary to make finance flows 
predictable.66 
Thus, the cma will decide on the collective quantified goal of Parties and it 
will also influence how financial support is provided, and the Paris Decision 
and not the Paris Agreement that make provision for both competences. 
c Compensation 
The so called ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’ (wim) 
is also incorporated into the Paris Agreement, Art. 8.67 This has several conse- 
quences, and the role of the mechanism in the future will depend on further 
decision-making of the cma. By including the wim, Parties acknowledge that 
next to mitigation and adaptation, the wim needed to be a self-standing con- 
cept, under which loss and damage could be addressed, in instances where 
mitigation and adaptation are not sufficient. Originally, the wim had been es- 
tablished under the Cancun Adaptation Framework and developed country 
Parties wished to see it included as part of the adaptation pillar only.68 The 
wim was thus upgraded in Paris. Furthermore, it is now operated under the 
authority and guidance of the cma, giving the cma the option to enhance and 
strengthen the mechanism, Art. 8 (2). 
 
 
65 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 52. 
66 Paris Decision, ibid., para. 55. 
67 See for the history of the mechanism M.J. Mace, and R. Verheyen, ‘Loss, Damage and Re- 
sponsibility after COP21: All Options Open for the Paris Agreement’. (2016) 25 reciel 197; 
L. Rajamani, ‘Addressing Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts’ (2015) Econom- 
ic & Political Weekly, available at at {  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/articles/Addressing_Loss
_and_Damage_from_Climate_Change_Impacts.pdf" \h } { 
HYPERLINK 
"http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/articles/Addressing_Loss
_and_Damage_from_Climate_Change_Impacts.pdf" \h } (last visited 7 
June 2018). 
68 Decision 2/CP.19, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. For the position of the US see { 
HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp
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/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_of_the_2105_agreem
ent.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp
/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_of_the_2105_agreem
ent.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp
/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_of_the_2105_agreem
ent.pdf" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018). 
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The function of the wim is to address loss and damage associated with im- 
pacts of climate change, through enhancing understanding, action and sup- 
port, Art. 8 (1), (3). The Executive Committee of the wim, the so-called wim 
ExCom, received the mandate in the Paris Decision to establish a clearing 
house that serves as a repository for information on insurance and risk trans- 
fer, for Parties to develop comprehensive risk management strategies.69 This 
operates now under the cma. 
Parties declared their intention to create a mechanism with a pioneering 
and catalytic nature to promote the implementation of approaches to address 
loss and damage and they also recognized the role of sustainable development 
in reducing the risk of loss and damage.70 The Agreement gives some guidance 
for the areas of cooperation, action and support.71 Read on its face, this general 
outline of the wim may spark the assumption that the mechanism introduces 
a new liability rule into the climate change regime. However, the Paris Deci- 
sion explicitly excludes this option, stating that ‘Art. 8 of the Agreement does 
not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’.72 What exactly 
this cop decision excludes from the wim is, however, not as clear as it might 
seem at a first glance. It could even be argued that this decision does not at all 
affect the capacity of the wim to develop over time a scheme that provides 
for financial compensation for loss and damage within liability rules.73 From 
the perspective of competence allocation, it is questionable whether the men- 
tioned cop decision can indeed bind future decision-making of the cma un- 
der the Paris Agreement. 
Yet the disclaimer in relation to liability in the Paris Decision made the 
inclusion of the wim in its present form into the Agreement acceptable for 
developed country Parties. This alone marks progress in two respects. First, 
it acknowledges that losses and damages will occur, even if the mitigation 
and adaptation efforts of Parties bring the world on track for the temperature 
range-goal of Art. 2 of the Agreement. Second, and even more importantly, 
 
 
69 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 48. For the latest report and 
how the mandate is operationalized see UN Doc FCCC/SB/2017/1. 
70 Decision 3/CP.22, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1. 
71 Paris Agreement, Decision, 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Art. 8 (4) lists: ‘Early 
warning systems, Emergency preparedness, slow onset events, events that may involve 
irreversible and permanent loss and damage, comprehensive risk assessment and man- 
agement, risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions, non- 
economic losses, resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems. 
72 
Paris Decision, ib
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e unpaired quotation mark in the sentence “…warning systems, Emergency preparedness”. 
73 M.J. Mace, and R. Verheyen, ‘Loss, Damage and Responsibility after COP21: All Options 
Open for the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 reciel 197, at 201. 
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States have acknowledged that they are collectively accountable for dispersed 
loss and damage, without as yet accepting elements of private actors’ or let 
alone State liability. The emphasis is less on identifying a single actor’s re- 
sponsibility than to find ways of addressing and minimizing risks that remain 
despite mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
The future of the wim has yet to be crafted through the cma, and this is the 
interesting point for the present argument: the Paris Agreement sets out only 
the basic parameters for the wim, the narrative for its purpose. It indicates that 
there are many areas of cooperation which would contribute to improving risk 
assessments. However, the Agreement then leaves the decision on how this 
is to be achieved and whether the wim may include liability elements in the 
future, to the discretion of the cma. 
d Transferring Compliance Control and the Carbon Market 
The following section discusses whether the cma may exercise compliance 
control over the actual conduct of Parties through the carbon market. Although 
the Paris Agreement does not explicitly refer to market-based approaches, it 
recognizes that some Parties may ‘use internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes towards nationally determined contributions’ for which ‘robust ac- 
counting’ must be ensured, Art. 6 (2). From the wording of the provision, it is 
not clear whether the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
will follow the market-based approaches of the Kyoto Protocol. Two questions 
arise from this. First, will the carbon market be linked with the compliance 
procedure, and second, how will the Paris carbon market contribute to mitiga- 
tion outcomes after the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
ends in 2020. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties have been realizing compliance with cli- 
mate targets through two main pillars, established by the cmp: the compliance 
procedure74 and the market mechanisms. Both are intertwined. The market 
mechanisms encompass Joint Implementation, Art. 6, the Clean Development 
mechanism, Art. 12, and Emission Trading, Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Devel- 
oped country Parties with quantified emission reduction targets undergo an ex- 
pert review process. This scrutinizes compliance with standardized reporting 
criteria on ghg inventory reports. During the review process, the Compliance 
Committee may become involved. This committee addresses the question of 
 
 
74 Art. 18 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 10 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 unts 148; Decision 
27/CMP.1 approved and adopted the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance 
under the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add/3, 92. 
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compliance through either the facilitative or enforcement branch, depending 
on the gravity of the respective irregularities.75 The verdict of non-compliance 
by the enforcement branch can be sanctioned with a temporary suspension 
of the right to participate in the market mechanisms until compliance is re- 
instated.76 This excludes the Party concerned from the use of market-based 
ghg emission reduction units to ensure their climate target is met. 
Asthis is an effective butcontroversialmeansof implementationcontrol, the 
Paris Agreement refrains from providing for a compliance procedure similar to 
the Kyoto Protocol, thereby paying tribute to concerns across developing and 
developed countries that the invasive non-compliance consequences could be 
extended post 2020.77 While Art. 15 of the Agreement establishes a mechanism 
to facilitate implementation and promote compliance, it emphasizes the facili- 
tative nature and excludes any adversarial and punitive approaches. In further 
contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Agreement falls short of detailing the conse- 
quence of non-compliance through a list of consequences for various degrees 
of non-compliance. It simply authorizes the cma to adopt the modalities and 
procedures for the operation of the compliance committee, which then reports 
tothecma annually, Art. 15 (3). Giventhislayout, itbecomesratherunlikelythat 
the Kyoto compliance mechanism and procedure will be continued. However, 
how the new Compliance Committee and procedure under the Agreement will 
be structured and operated remains unclear. It is worth mentioning that the 
Kyoto Protocol would require an amendment for any procedures and mecha- 
nisms in relation to compliance control which entail binding consequences, 
Art. 18 Kyoto Protocol.78 Yet, this restriction is not repeated in the wording of 
the Paris Agreement. It may be that this was considered dispensable given the 
 
 
75 UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 3, 96, vi, see for instance CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB 
para. 3 (e). However, any Party may submit such a question with respect to itself or with 
respect to another Party, supported by pertinent and corroborating information, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 3, 96, vi, para. 1 (a), (b). 
76 Ibid., v, paras 4 (a)–(c), for an example see the above discussed case of Croatia. See also C. 
Voigt, ‘The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 
25 reciel 161. 
77 See L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpreta- 
tive Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 iclq 493, at 505. 
78 Art. 18 Kyoto Protocol reads: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective 
procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indica- 
tive list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of 
non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding 
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol’. 
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envisaged facilitative nature of the new compliance procedure. However, even 
a non-adversarial and non-punitive procedure does not necessarily exclude the 
option of entailing legally binding measures. To include legally binding mea- 
sures, it would need to be argued that they fall within the powers of the cma 
to adopt modalities and procedures and not require amending the Agreement. 
The second question concerning the transfer of Kyoto mechanisms arises 
from the continuity of the market mechanisms. Even though the contribution 
of ghg emission reduction units acquired by States through participation in 
the carbon market was limited to a certain amount to ensure that they would 
only complement national efforts,79 difficulties in accounting procedures re- 
main. To ensure that the assigned amounts of each Party can be allocated at 
all times, especially when a Party starts trading under the different market 
mechanisms, national registries and an international mechanism to verify and 
allocate emission reduction units are required.80 This international mecha- 
nism has been established under the Kyoto Protocol’s trading scheme with the 
international transaction log (itl) and additional, supplementary transaction 
logs.81 The itl performs checks in order to approve the submitted data, thereby 
ensuring that transactions of emissions reductions units are transparent, con- 
form to the rules of the Kyoto Protocol and to the data exchange standards.82 
 
79 While Art. 17 Kyoto Protocol states that the emission trading shall be supplemental to do- 
mestic actions, it does not provide for a certain limit of trading as compared to domestic 
measures, supra note 75. To ensure that a Party does not oversell units, each Party is required 
to maintain a reserve of erus, cers, aaus and/or rmus in its national registry, which 
must account for 90% of the Party’s assigned amount or 100 per cent of five times its most 
recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest, available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/ite
ms/2731.php" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/ite
ms/2731.php" \h }(last visited 29 September 2017). 
80 The following registry systems can be identified: ‘(a) national registries, to be established 
and maintained by the Parties; (b) the clean development mechanism registry, to be es- 
tablished and maintained by the secretariat, under the authority of the Executive Board 
of the cdm, to manage accounts for non-annex i Parties, and entities authorized by them; 
(c) the international transaction log, to be established and maintained by the secretariat 
to monitor and verify the validity of transaction proposed by national registries and the 
cdm registry; (d) supplementary transaction logs which may be established and main- 
tained by Annex i Parties to monitor and verify the validity of transactions proposed by 
their national registries. One example is the European Union Community Independent 
Transaction Log’. UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2005/INF.3, para. 6. 
81 Supplementary checks are performed through the European Union Community Indepen- 
dent Transaction Log and other supplementary transaction logs. FCCC/SBSTA/2005/INF.3, 
5. For a discussion see also A.S. Tabau, and S. Maljean-Dubois, ‘Non-compliance Mecha- 
nisms: Interaction between the Kyoto Protocol System and the European Union’ (2010) 21 
ejil 749, 753. 
82 These standards have been defined based on decision 24/CP.8, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2002/7/ 
Add.3. 
300845 0004173550.INDD  146 8/3/2018   8:46:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
146 Minnerop 
 
All of the market mechanisms are operated for the purpose of meeting the tar- 
gets of net emission changes for Parties involved. The Paris Agreement does not 
directly translate these market mechanisms into its agenda. It spells out the 
expectation that the contribution to mitigation with internationally acquired 
mitigation outcomes will lead to higher ambition and promote sustainable de- 
velopment, Art. 6 (1), (4). Decisions on the further concretization of the mecha- 
nisms are within the competence of the cma, Art. 6 (4), (7). The Paris Decision 
contains a reference to experience gained with and lessons learned from exist- 
ing mechanisms under the Convention and its related legal instruments.83 This 
justifies the expectation that the Kyoto mechanisms will influence the devel- 
opment of the carbon market beyond the second commitment period, albeit 
without clearly indicating the extent this could gain, leaving a considerable 
amount of discretion to future decisions of the cma when adopting rules and 
modalities. 
As a novelty, Art. 6 (9) introduces a ‘framework for non-market approaches to 
sustainable development’. These ‘integrated, holistic and balanced non-market 
approaches’ comprise, in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication, efforts on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and 
capacity-building, Art. 6 (8). The framework aims at promoting mitigation and 
adaptation ambition and the participation of public and private sectors in the 
implementation of nationally determined contributions. The Paris Decision 
assigns the mandate to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice to undertake a work programme under the framework for non-market 
approaches to sustainable development. The work programme must be con- 
sidered and adopted by the cma.84 
 
iii Law-making cma Decisions 
So far, this article has considered the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision, 
both adopted by the cop, with a focus on provisions that enable the cma to 
adopt strategic decisions, in exercising its oversight function and in steering 
Party’s conduct. The following part elaborates why the different composition 
of Parties’ conferences or meetings under the unfccc matters from a legal 
point of view (1). This is followed by a discussion of criteria set forth in interna- 
tional law generally to identify law-making decisions (2). The term ‘law-making’ 
is crucial for this part and deserves some attention to clarify the underlying 
 
83 Paris Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 37 (f). 
84 Paris Decision, ibid., paras 39, 40. 
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assumption. Law-making in this context refers to the creation of a legal rule 
that articulates a norm in ‘ought quality’.85 Thus, for a certain activity or situa- 
tion, a legal rule expressly articulates what must be done as a matter of law, not 
because of habit or convention.86 Indicative of the will to create law in Parties’ 
decisions is the use of mandatory language, ‘shall’. By contrast, only a strong 
recommendation is made when using the word ‘should’. In addition, the spe- 
cific reference to ‘each Party’ instead of the more general reference to ‘Parties’ 
is indicative of the ‘ought quality’ of the norm. It is also worth to note that the 
question of whether a rule can be enforced, does not determine its status as 
being legally binding.87 
1 The Distinct Roles of the cop, cmp and cma 
Art. 7 unfccc establishes the cop as the supreme body of the Convention. 
Defining the subject matter competence of the cop, the provision states that 
the cop ‘shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Conven- 
tion and any related legal instruments’, Art. 7 (2) unfccc. Thus, the mandate 
of the cop to review Parties’ progress and implementation extends to further 
legal instruments that can be (or have been) adopted by the cop. These in- 
clude the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision.88 The 
cop has extended the mandate to the newly created cma, to adopt further 
decisions based on the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision. Whether the 
Parties’ conference is acting as cop, cmp or cma, the same rules of proce- 
dure apply, unless otherwise decided by consensus.89 This could imply that 
the differentiation between the cop, cmp and the cma is merely an exercise 
in terminology. However, it does very much matter, in legal terms, whether 
a decision is taken by the cop under the unfccc, or by the cmp under the 
Kyoto Protocol, or the cma under the Paris Agreement, with direct legal conse- 
quences for Parties affected by the relevant decision. This will be illustrated in 
the following by reference to a decision of the Compliance Committee under 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
85 N. MacCormick, N, Institutions of Law (oup 2007) at 42. 
86 This could also result from an ‘internal aspect’ of conduct, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(2nd edned oup 1994), at 56, 88. 
87 See N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law (oup 2007) at 26, 61. 
88 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 75, Art. 13 (1); Paris Agreement, supra note 11, Art. 16 (1); it also 
manifests itself in the decision adopted by the cma at its first meeting in November 2016, 
as the cma invites the cop to continue to oversee the implementation of the work pro- 
gramme under the Paris Agreement in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, para. 5. 
89 Art. 13 (5) Paris Agreement, supra note 11; Art. 16 (5) Kyoto Protocol, supra note 75. See De- 
cision 2/CMA.1 Rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2016/3/Add.1. 
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In this case, the Compliance Committee refused to take a decision of the 
cop under the unfccc into account, when considering Croatia’s compliance 
with its targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The Compliance Committee under 
the Kyoto Protocol acts in many ways like a tribunal. Its decisions, which have 
received little attention in scholarly literature, have immediate consequences 
for the Parties concerned, as the following example illustrates. A case was re- 
ferred to the Compliance Committee after the expert review raised concerns 
about Croatia’s compliance with emission levels. Croatia had claimed that be- 
cause of its particularly difficult circumstances as a country with an economy 
in transition, it should be entitled to increase its level of emissions for the base 
year 1990, through adding 3.5 Mt CO2 equivalent. The cop decided pursuant 
to Art. 4 (6) unfccc that Croatia was indeed a country with an economy in 
transition and should thus be allowed to add this additional amount of emis- 
sions to its base year emission levels. This resulted in a higher level of emis- 
sion allowances and made compliance with the reduction target easier to 
accomplish.90 
However, the Compliance Committee decided that Croatia exceeded its al- 
lowance of emissions and was in non-compliance with its assigned amounts 
of emissions and the commitment period reserve under the Kyoto Protocol, 
and did so without considering the decision of the cop. It did not accept the 
argument that the decision of the cop under the unfccc could support Croa- 
tia’s claim. By contrast, the enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee 
held that in the absence of a decision of the cmp under the Kyoto Protocol on 
Croatia’s specific circumstances, the decision of the cop under the Convention 
could not be used by Croatia to add to its assigned amount of emission levels 
for the achievement of its targets under the Kyoto Protocol.91 
It stated: ‘Since the Conference of Parties and the Conference of Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are two distinct 
decision-making bodies, the fact that all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are also 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change does 
not provide sufficient basis for establishing the application of cop decisions 
under the Kyoto Protocol’.92 
 
90 Decision 7/CP.12 ‘Level of Emissions for the Base Year of Croatia’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2006/5/ 
Add.1 para. 2: ‘Decides that Croatia, having invoked Art. 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, 
shall be allowed to add 3.5 Mt CO2 equivalent of its 1990 level of greenhouse gas emissions 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for establishing the level of emissions for emis- 
sions for the base year for implementation of its commitments under Art. 4, paragraph 2, 
of the Convention’. 
91 UN, CC-2009-1-6/Croatia/EB (13 October 2009) para. 21 (a). 
92 UN, CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB (26 November 2009) para. 3 (c). 
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This led to the declaration of non-compliance of Croatia with its Kyoto 
commitments and suspended Croatia’s eligibility to participate in the market 
mechanisms under Arts 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Such an exclusion of 
a Party means that any participation in the carbon market is suspended, until 
compliance is re-instated. Croatia initially lodged an appeal against this deci- 
sion to the cmp but withdrew this at a later stage.93 After submitting a revised 
plan for the reinstatement of compliance related to the calculation of the as- 
signed amounts and the commitment period reserve, the enforcement branch 
decided that there no longer continued to be a question of implementation, 
and Croatia was again eligible to participate in the market mechanisms.94 
The interesting point of this in the present context is that the Compliance 
Committee of the Kyoto Protocol emphasized that the ‘Conference of Parties’ 
acts as a ‘distinct decision-making body’ under the respective legal instruments. 
The Committee based this argument explicitly on Art. 31 of the Vienna Con- 
vention on the Law of Treaties,95 and also on customary international law.96 
The Kyoto Protocol allows flexibility only for the use of a different base year 
than 1990, Art. 3 (5) and not, as argued by the Croatian government, for chang- 
es to the historical level of anthropogenic emissions of ghg through adding 
emission allowance to the base year. The Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 
thus allow different degrees of flexibility available to Parties with economies in 
transition.97 This demonstrates that decisions of the cop and the cmp, even if 
they would result in the same outcome, are not interchangeable and that they 
have distinct legal consequences. With the newly created cma under the Paris 
Agreement, a third separate body within the climate regime is added. The legal 
 
93 See UN, CC-2009-1-14/Croatia/EB (8 February 2012) para. 2, UN, CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB, 
26 November 2009. 
94 Ibid., supra note 91, CC-2009-1-14, para. 12. 
95 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 unts 331 (‘Vienna Convention’), the importance of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on the Law of Treaties for the interpretation of any international treaty corresponds 
with the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the ultimate authority on any 
matters dealt with in its text, see H. Thirlway, ‘The International Court of Justice: Cruising 
ahead at 70’ (2016) 29 ljil 1103, at 1110. 
96 UN, CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB, 26 November 2009, para. 3 (a): ‘pursuant to Art. 31 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law, a treaty 
must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. It could 
be argued that the enforcement branch needed not to mention customary international 
law in addition to Art. 31 vclt as the provision is recognized as reflecting customary in- 
ternational law, see icj, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] icj Rep 
6, at para. 41. 
97 Ibid., para. 3 (d). 
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impact of the cma will be of even greater importance considering the role the 
cma will be playing in shaping the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement and 
particularly in the oversight of the Paris Agreement. 
2 cma Decisions in International Law 
Law-making in the framework of multilateral environmental treaties, as tradi- 
tionally conceived, is firmly anchored in the consent of all Parties to a treaty 
and its amendments.98 The Paris Agreement confronts this concept with a new 
reality, where law-making occurs through decision-making that potentially 
replaces the need for treaty amendments or further protocols. While these de- 
cisions are still supported by Parties’ consent, they are not part of the interna- 
tional treaty. However, that does not mean that they cannot be legally binding. 
The following section focuses on developing criteria to identify legally binding 
cma decisions. 
The institution ‘meeting or conference of Parties’ is a stand-alone concept 
in international law. Organizationally, it can be described as a hybrid between 
a diplomatic conference and a permanent plenary body of an international 
organization.99 More importantly is its function: States use conferences or 
meetings of Parties as a forum of review and action for implementing and 
developing multilateral law-making treaties.100 Their decisions can develop 
an international treaty regime faster than any formal amendment procedure 
would allow. However, the legal implications of the decisions and their impact 
on Parties’ obligations under the treaty regime are not always clear cut. Not all 
decisions taken in the framework of a conference or meeting of Parties are le- 
gally binding; they can also be recommendations for Parties or simply indicate 
a political intention. These issues have attracted much debate in scholarly lit- 
erature. It has been argued that these decisions produce ‘soft law’,101 that they 
 
98 J. Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-making under Multilateral Environmental Agree- 
ments’ (2002) 15 ljil 1. 
99 J. Brunnée, ibid., 16. The Whaling Commission is an example of a body of an international 
organization with relatively far-reaching competences, see Art. iii, v, of International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (signed 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 
November 1948) 161 unts 72. 
100 V. Röben, ‘Conference (Meeting) of States Parties’, in R. Wolfrum, (ed.), Max Planck En- 
cyclopedia of Public International Law (oup 2008–), available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.mpepil.com/" \h }, (last visited 10 October 2017). 
101 The category of ‘soft law’ has been criticized frequently, see for instance L. Blutman, ‘In 
the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law’ (2010) 59 iclq 605, at 609; J. Ellis, 
‘Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law’ (2012) 25 ljil 313, 
at 314; V. Röben, ‘Institutional Developments under Modern International Environmental 
Agreements’ (2000) 4 MaxPlanckunyb 363, 371; P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity 
300845 0004173550.INDD  151 8/3/2018   8:46:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
Taking the Paris Agreement Forward 151 
have an operational impact,102 or manifest subsequent agreement between 
Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty in the sense of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of the Treaties.103 There are also instances where the 
conference or meeting of Parties may adopt legally binding decisions because 
of a specific empowerment by the Parties.104 However, the crucial question 
is whether decisions without such explicit authorization in an international 
agreement can also be legally binding. The illustration given above for the Kyo- 
to Protocol demonstrates that they can determine the outcome of hard-law 
questions such as compliance or non-compliance of a State. Broader claims 
have also been made that Parties’ conferences or meetings take on the role of 
international legislatures more generally,105 leading to ‘legislative law-making’ 
next to ‘contractual law-making’.106 Yet this may risk over-looking significant 
differences between international legal regimes. 
 
 
in International Law?’ (1983) 77 ajil 413, 422. However, ‘soft law’ might well guide the 
interpretation of law. The International Court of Justice emphasized the need to take new 
standards and norms into consideration, with a view of to ‘reconcile economic develop- 
ment with protection of the environment’ as ‘aptly expressed in the concept of sustain- 
able development’ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] icj Rep 7, at 
77–78, para. 140. 
102 D. French, and L. Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and International Environmental Law: Mus- 
ings on a Journey to Somewhere’ (2013) 25 jel 437, at 444. 
103 Art. 31 (3) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 unts 331. Even recommendations which are not 
legally binding, can be a means for interpretation if they were adopted unanimously, 
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) [2014], icj Rep 226, 
at 248, para. 46: ‘These recommendations, which take the form of resolutions, are not 
binding. However, when they are adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, they may 
be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule’. 
104 Under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 
September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) 1522 unts 3, adjustments to the ozone 
depleting potentials of controlled substances can be enacted by a majority two thirds 
majority, and the decisions are then binding without the requirement of further consent 
of States and without offering an opt out procedure, Art. 2 (9) c and d. 
105 J. Brunnée, ‘Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environ- 
mental Framework Agreements’, in R. Wolfrum, and V. Röben, (eds), Developments of In- 
ternational Law in Treaty Making (Springer 2005), 101, 109; T. Meyer, ‘From Contract to 
Legislation: The Logic of Modern International Law making’ (2014) 14 ChiJIntlL 559, 563; 
A. Steinbach, ‘The Trend towards Non-consensualism in Public International Law: a (Be- 
havioural) Law and Economics Perspective’ (2016) 27 ejil 463, at 658. 
106 T. Meyer, ibid., 571. While it is correct that a protocol to the unfccc to replace the Kyoto 
Protocol ‘cannot be ratified by states until it is first adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties to the unfccc ’, it is also worth to mention that the text of any proposed protocol 
shall be communicated to the Parties before such a session where it can be adopted, supra 
note 2, Art. 17 (2) unfccc. 
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Indeed, a ‘one size fits all approach’ is rather difficult to devise. The Inter- 
national Law Commission (ilc)107 has offered a different approach to dif- 
ferentiate between legally binding decisions of a ‘Conference of Parties’ in 
international law, and those decisions that remain politically important but do 
not gain legal value. The ilc adopted in 2016 draft conclusions on subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of trea- 
ties.108 Pursuant to these draft conclusions, the legal effect of such decisions 
depends on the particular case109 and has to be determined in the light of the 
treaty, the rules of procedure and the circumstances of the concrete decision.110 
The ‘specificity and the clarity of the terms chosen in the light of the text of the 
Conference of States Parties’ decision as a whole’ must be considered, and ‘its 
object and purpose, and the way in which it is applied, need to be taken into 
account’.111 Legally binding decisions have to be clearly distinguished from a 
mere provision of practical options for implementation.112 A further relevant 
consideration is ‘whether States Parties uniformly or without challenge apply 
the treaty as interpreted by the Conference of States Parties’ decision’.113 The 
provision of a respective competence in the treaty is not a necessary condi- 
tion for the decision to create a legal effect: ‘In any case, it cannot simply be 
said that because the treaty does not accord the Conference of States Parties 
a competence to take legally binding decisions, their decisions are necessarily 
legally irrelevant and constitute only political commitments’.114 
 
107 Established by the General Assembly, in 1947, under Art. 13 (1) (a) of the Charter of the 
United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 unts 16. 
108 UN ilc ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-Eighth Ses- 
sion’ (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016) gaor 71st Session Supp 10, Chapter vi: 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of trea- 
ties. For the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur Georg Nolte see GA, A/CN.4/694. 
109 Text of the draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in rela- 
tion to the interpretation of treaties adopted by the Commission, gaor 71st Session Supp 
10, Part Four, Specific aspects Conclusion 11 [10] Decisions adopted within the framework 
of a Conference of States Parties, Commentary, at 201. 
110 ‘The legal effect of a decision adopted within the framework of a Conference of States 
Parties depends primarily on the treaty and any applicable rules of procedure. Depending 
on the circumstances, such a decision may embody, explicitly or implicitly, a subsequent 
agreement under Art. 31, paragraph 3 (a), or give rise to subsequent practice under Art. 
31, paragraph 3 (b), or to subsequent practice under Art. 32. Decisions adopted within the 
framework of a Conference of States Parties often provide a non-exclusive range of practi- 
cal options for implementing the treaty’. ibid., para. 2. 
111 Ibid., para. 23. 
112 Ibid., para. 24. 
113 Ibid., para. 27. 
114 Ibid., para. 26, see also Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Interven- 
ing) (Judgment) [2014] icj Rep 226, 248, para. 46. 
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With the ilc guidance in mind, the question of how the cma will direct 
the future development and implementation of the Paris Agreement and, for 
instance, whether the cma could adjust the temperature goal through a le- 
gally binding decision, can be answered as follows. Whether such a decision 
would be legally binding, would depend on the wording and the intention of 
the cma. An adjustment of the temperature goal within the given range of Art. 
2 (1) (a) Paris Agreement could be framed in a legally binding decision and con- 
sequently create tighter obligations for Parties. Such a strategic decision would 
not need to comply with the procedural requirements of an amendment to the 
Agreement, as it would have been the case pre-Paris. This is not to say that such 
a decision will be taken, but merely that the legal possibility exists under the 
Agreement; as outlined in Part ii, this is but one example among many other 
competences that the Agreement enshrines for law-making through cma de- 
cisions. Thus, the same rules apply to any other future decisions of the cma, 
based on the competences that the Agreement and the Paris Decision accord. 
This potential for legal impact is not only relevant, internally, for the evolv- 
ing international regime on climate change itself, but there are external con- 
sequences where the international regime touches another legal order, be it 
that of a State Party or of an international organization, such as the European 
Union (EU). A full analysis of the significance of the Agreement for the Euro- 
pean legal order would go beyond the scope of this article. The following dis- 
cussion focuses on the question how the governance of the European Energy 
Union is prepared for interaction with continuous decision-making of Parties. 
 
IV External Impact of cma Decisions: The Governance of the 
European Energy Union 
1 Competence of the European Union for Climate Action 
It is the EU’s self-perception to be at the heart of the High Ambition Coalition, 
a group of developed and developing country Parties pressing for ambitious 
Climate action.115 This flows from the principle of high level environmental 
protection as one of the general objectives and upwards moving targets of the 
EU, Art. 3 (3) Treaty on European Union (teu).116 The Paris Agreement was 
adopted by the EU on the basis of the general provision on the Environment, 
 
 
115 For the historic development of the High Ambition Coalition see { HYPERLINK 
"http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6320_en.htm" \h 
}{ HYPERLINK "http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-
6320_en.htm" \h }(last visited 29 September 2017). 
116 E. Morgera, ‘Environmental Law’ in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), European Union Law 
(oup 2017) 666. teu, OJ EU 2016 C 202/13. 
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Art. 191 Treaty on the Function of the European Union (tfeu) in conjunction 
with Art. 218 (6) (a) tfeu.117 For the implementation of internationally agreed 
climate action, the EU takes recourse to the newly acquired energy compe- 
tence.118 With the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, the Euro- 
pean Union gained the competence for legislation in the field of energy, Art. 
194 tfeu.119 This provision aims at ensuring the functioning of the energy mar- 
ket, security of energy supply, promoting energy efficiency and energy saving 
and the development of new and renewable forms of energy, Art. 194 (1) tfeu. 
Energy is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States, Art. 4 
(2) (i) tfeu.120 When exercising its energy competence, Union measures shall 
not affect the right of the Member States to ‘determine the conditions for ex- 
ploiting its energy resource, its choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply’, Art. 194 (2) tfeu. Together with the 
environment competence of the EU in Arts 191, 192 tfeu, the energy compe- 
tence permits a climate-driven multi-level regulation of a decarbonized energy 
economy, which becomes the transmission belt for the Paris Agreement, the 
Paris Decision and cma decision-making thereunder. 
2 Aligning the Governance of the Energy Union with the Paris 
Agreement, the Paris Decision and Future cma Decisions 
In November 2016, the EU Commission submitted its proposal for a regulation 
(hereinafter ‘draft regulation’) of the European Parliament and of the Coun- 
cil on the governance of the European Energy Union, consistent with ambi- 
tious climate action under the Paris Agreement.121 The draft regulation aims 
at bringing together ‘existing scattered planning and reporting obligations 
from the main pieces of EU legislation across energy, climate and other Energy 
Union related policy areas’.122 It is designed to ensure that the EU’s 2030 energy 
and climate targets are attained. The Council introduced in May 2018 the pro- 
posal to amend the title of the draft regulation to regulation on ‘Governance of 
 
117   Council Decision (EU) 2016/1841 of 5 October 2016, OJ L 282 (19.10.2016), 1–3. 
118 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Gover- 
nance of the Energy Union, of 30 November 2016, com (2016)759 final, at 4. 
119  tfeu, OJ EU 2016 C 202/47. 
120 For a discussion of the concept of shared competences see R. Schütze, European Union 
Law (cup 2015) 238. 
121 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the gov- 
ernance of the Energy Union, of 30 November 2016, com (2016)759 final. The proposal 
is currently being considered by the Council and the European Parliament in the ordi- 
nary legislative procedure, for the position of the Council see the Interinstitutional File 
2016/0375 (cod) of 8 May 2018. 
122  com (2016)759 final, at 2. 
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the Energy Union and Climate Action’.123 The European Parliament proposed 
to introduce into the Preamble of the regulation reference to the Paris Agree- 
ment, that would explicitly align the 2030 and long-term objectives of the En- 
ergy Union with the 2015 Paris Agreement.124 While there are many elements 
still to be discussed between the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament concerning the draft regulation,125 agreement exists in so far as the 
draft regulation aims at integrating the objectives and mechanisms of the Paris 
Agreement into the EU governance structure.126 
Especially the provision on aggregate assessment of national plans and tar- 
get achievement links the efforts of Member States under the draft regulation 
directly with their commitments under the Paris Agreement. The European 
Council invites in its conclusions following the meeting in March 2018 the 
Commission to present ‘by the first quarter of 2019 a proposal for a Strategy 
for long-term EU greenhouse gas emissions reduction in accordance with the 
Paris Agreement, taking into account the national plans’.127 These ‘national 
plans’ are the integrated national energy and climate plans that the draft regu- 
lation requires from Member States.128 The Council’s position is to encourage 
Member States to provide their first integrated national energy and climate 
plans as early as possible in order to allow proper preparations, in particular 
 
123 Council of the European Union, Annex to the Interinstitutional File 2016/0375 (cod) of 8 
May 2018, at 8. 
124 Ibid., at 10. 
125 For instance, the nature of the four key targets that were agreed on 24 October 2014 on the 
2030 Framework for Energy and Climate for the Union is subject to debate: The Commis- 
sion’s proposal and the Parliament’s position is that there were four targets agreed: at least 
40% cut in economy wide greenhouse gas emissions, at least 27% improvement in energy 
efficiency with a view to a level of 30%, at least 27% for the share of renewable energy 
consumed in the Union, and at least 15% for electricity interconnection. The Council’s po- 
sition is that 27% improvement in energy efficiency were agreed as an indicative target, to 
be reviewed by 2020, Annex to the Interinstitutional File 2016/0375 (cod) of 8 May 2018, 
at 13. See also the conclusion of the European Council on 24 October 2014, euco 169/14, 
at 5. 
126 ‘The proposed Regulation contributes to the implementation of the Paris Agreement in- 
cluding its five-years review cycle and ensures that monitoring, reporting and verification 
requirements under the unfccc and Paris Agreement are harmoniously integrated in 
the governance of the Energy Union’, ibid., at 3. The European Parliament’s position is to 
make this alignment even more explicit, see Annex to the interinstitutional file 2016/0375 
(cod) of 8 May 2018, at 14. 
127 European Council, euco 1/18, 23 March 2018, at 4. For guidance on national plans 
com(2015) 572 final, 18 November 2015. 
128 Art. 3 (1) of the draft regulation reads requires that ‘by 1 January 2019 and every ten years 
thereafter, each Member State shall notify to the Commission an integrated national en- 
ergy and climate plan’. com(2016) 759 final, at 25. 
300845 0004173550.INDD  156 8/3/2018   8:46:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
156 Minnerop 
 
for the participation in the facilitative dialogue under the Paris Agreement.129 
Starting from October 2021, the Commission will annually assess the progress 
of Member States towards achieving: ‘commitments under Art. 4 of the un- 
fccc and Art. 3 of the Paris Agreement as set out in decisions adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties to the unfccc, or by the Conference of the Parties 
to the unfccc serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement’, 
Art. 25 (4) (a) draft regulation. 
This particular provision opens the European Union legal order for dynamic 
obligations, explicitly as they arise from strategic cma decision-making under 
the referenced provisions. It is surprising that the Commission in its proposal 
refers to Art. 3 Paris Agreement, a provision which does not contain an obliga- 
tion for each Party, but nevertheless creates a strong normative expectation of 
progression overall.130 Art. 3 sets out a cross-cutting provision that envisages 
progression and improvement, yet only Art. 4 (2) Paris Agreement provides an 
obligation of each Party to prepare and communicate nationally determined 
contributions. To place Art. 3 Paris Agreement and not Art. 4 (2) Paris Agree- 
ment on the same level as Art. 4 unfccc may indicate a different reading by 
the Commission: that both provisions are the legal basis for future commit- 
ments. This would place an additional value on the cross-cutting provision 
of Art. 3 Paris Agreement and the expectation of progression that it entails. 
It is also worthwhile mentioning in this context that Art. 3 Paris Agreement 
does not enable the cma explicitly to adopt decisions, while Art. 4 paragraph 2 
(d) unfccc does, in obliging the cop to review the adequacy of the commit- 
ments of Annex i Parties. The Commission’s reading of Art. 3 Paris Agreement 
in conjunction with Art. 4 unfccc turns the former into an enabling clause 
that it is not when read on its face. 
The draft regulation aims at harmonizing the existing Climate Monitor- 
ing Mechanism with the provisions of the Paris Agreement and to enable the 
EU to participate in the review process under the new transparency frame- 
work.131 To ensure compliance with the increased transparency requirements 
of the Paris Agreement, EU Member States will be obliged to submit biennial 
progress reports ‘on the implementation of the plans from 2021 onwards across 
 
129 Ibid., at 26. 
130 ‘[A]ll Parties are to undertake’ … and ‘The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression 
over time…’, see also L. Rajamani, ‘Guiding Principles and General Obligation (Article 2.2 
and Article 3)’, in D. Klein et al. (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Commen- 
tary and Analysis (oup 2017), Part ii, Chapter 8. 
131 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the gover- 
nance of the Energy Union, of 30 November 2016, com (2016)759 final, at 5. See also the 
impact assessment of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the governance of the Energy Union, swd(2016) 394 final, at 17. 
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the five dimensions of the Energy Union to track progress’.132 This comprises a 
biennial report on national climate change adaptation planning and strategies, 
‘in line with the timeline given in the Paris Agreement’. However, it should be 
mentioned that this timeline is not set out in the Paris Agreement, but in the 
Paris Decision.133 
The draft regulation establishes national system requirements, to account 
for nationally determined contributions. This includes the legal basis for the 
establishment of Union and national registries to allow for the use of interna- 
tionally transferred mitigation outcomes under Arts 4 (13) and 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. Member States are obliged to establish by 1 January 2021, and to 
continuously improve thereafter, their national inventory systems to estimate 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gas- 
es. The draft regulation goes beyond the Paris Agreement at present, in so far 
as it also contains a list of certain greenhouse gases that are to be included in 
those national inventory systems.134 This also holds true for the assessment 
of progress at Union level in relation to the objectives of the Energy Union, 
the progress made by each Member State towards meeting its own targets, 
the effects of air traffic on overall emissions and pertinent data, Art. 25 draft 
regulation. 
The draft regulation includes the proposal to confer on the Commission the 
competenceinaccordancewith Art. 290 tfeu ‘toamendthegeneralframework 
for integrated national energy and climate plans (template), set up a financing 
platform to which Member States can contribute in case the Union trajec- 
tory towards the 2030 Union renewable energy target is not collectively met, 
take account of changes in the global warming potentials and internationally 
agreed inventory guidelines, and set substantive requirements for the Union 
inventory system…’. In exercising its competence, the Commission ‘should 
also consider, where necessary, decisions adopted under the unfccc and the 
Paris Agreement’. This conferral of competence on the Commission to ‘adopt 
non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain 
non-essential elements of the legislative act’, Art. 90 (1) tfeu, does not come 
without constraints. The European Parliament or the Council may decide to 
revoke the delegated power. However, the mandate of the Commission is closely 
 
 
132 These five dimensions are: energy security solidarity and trust; internal energy market; 
moderation of demand; decarbonization including renewable energy; and research, in- 
novation  and competitiveness. 
133 Paris Decision, 1/CP.21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 60. 
134 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the gover- 
nance of the Energy Union, of 30 November 2016, com (2016)759 final, Chapter 6, Art. 30 
(1), ghg listed in Part 2 of Annex iii to the draft regulation. 
300845 0004173550.INDD  158 8/3/2018   8:46:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
158 Minnerop 
 
linked with future strategic decisions under the Paris Agreement and the Paris 
Decision. 
The draft regulation is based on previous decisions adopted by the Europe- 
an Council, the Energy Council and the European Parliament, a strong positive 
indicator for adoption.135 It shapes the aim of the Energy Union in relation to 
international legislation. The draft regulation indicates that future EU legisla- 
tion will be aligned not only with the Paris Agreement, but also with relevant 
cop and cma decisions. Consequently, these decisions will influence the leg- 
islative process in the EU. Concerning the use of Art. 3 Paris Agreement as the 
legal foundation for future commitments, it remains to be seen whether EU 
legislation in turn might also contribute to the interpretation of certain provi- 
sions of the Agreement as enabling clauses. 
 
V Executive Law-making, Legal Certainty and Legitimacy 
The new approach to law-making, where obligations of Parties are to be con- 
cretized and even created outside the international treaty through decisions, 
inevitably affects the significance of the international treaty as the manner and 
form of international law-making. The Paris Agreement sets forth a new modus 
operandi of law-making. It couples a treaty with strategic infra-treaty decision- 
making that entails legal consequences, but provides less legal certainty and 
affects the legitimacy of the international treaty as traditionally perceived. 
1 Legal Certainty 
The Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision set out competences for future 
action of the cma. The Paris Agreement provides a distinct narrative as the 
foundation for the exercise of these competences, however, the Paris Decision 
provides in many instances a greater number of regulatory details, with legal 
relevance, than mere interpretations of the Agreement would do. In addition, 
the analysis above has pointed out that the cma will have to flesh out many 
provisions. These decisions of the cma will build the operative layer of the 
Agreement. This layer will determine the success of the global effort to reduce 
the risks of climate change. 
The cma will have to clarify what a sufficiently ambitious ndc will look 
like, to define terms such as ‘flexibility’, to ensure the provision of sufficient 
financial support, and to develop mechanisms such as the global stocktake or 
 
135 See also the discussion in the Council, Council of the European Union, 20 September 
2017, 7204/1/17 REV 1, leaving the here discussed provisions unchanged. 
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the wim. This renders future formal treaty-making and even amendment pro- 
cedures superfluous. 
This approach risks diminishing the significance of the Paris Agreement. 
Parties adopted a framework convention that would be widely acceptable, 
with considerable leeway for cma decisions to steer further climate action. 
This may well guarantee speedier regime development, in line with scientific 
knowledge. But it lacks any formalized guarantee that this will happen: prog- 
ress depends largely on Parties’ decisions. By contrast, an obligation enshrined 
in an international treaty is more difficult to change, and therefore, provides a 
higher level of legal certainty. States have no discretion but to implement such 
obligations, otherwise they risk to breach the treaty.136 
Leaving the decision on the creation of future legally binding obligations to 
strategic decision-making, risks first of all, that the relevant decision will never 
be adopted. No new obligation will arise in that scenario. In the reality of mul- 
tilateral treaty negotiations a Party will align its own interests with that of oth- 
er Parties to achieve certain outcomes on a wider range of issues. By contrast, 
a Party is more likely to block a single decision outside the context of such 
complex treaty negotiations, where the Party might not lose as much substan- 
tial bargaining power as a result.137 Furthermore, if a new decision is adopted 
but a Party decides not to comply with it, the consequences that this has under 
international law are not as clear. While these decisions can represent legally 
binding obligations, as discussed above, the consequences of a breach of such 
a decision of a Parties’ meeting is not clearly established in international law. 
Perhaps rules for this event need to be developed as law-making gravitates into 
strategic decisions at infra-treaty level. Arguably, one could explore the use of 
a broad interpretation of Art. 12 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
regarding the ‘origin or character’ of an international obligation, as the pivotal 
point for defining a Party’s non-compliance with such a decision as a breach of 
 
 
 
136 Art. 12 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
in UN ilc ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third 
Session’ (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) gaor 56th Session Supp 10; see also 
J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, Introduc- 
tion, Text and Commentaries (cup 2002). 
137 Falkner points out that even if minilateral climate clubs were established as part of the 
unfccc framework, their bargaining power would not necessarily be sufficient to pres- 
surize large emitters, see R. Falkner, ‘A minilateral solution for global climate change? On 
bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and international legitimacy’ (2016) 14  Perspectives 
on Politics 1, 87, at 97. 
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an international obligation.138 The relevant question here is to decide whether 
or not law-making through strategic decisions by a Parties’ meeting is captured 
by the ilc’s definition of law-creating processes that are recognized by inter- 
national law. Despite the fact that Art. 12 of the Draft Articles on State Respon- 
sibility sets out a wide approach in defining the sources of an international 
obligation, the ilc commentary stresses that the ‘formula “regardless of its ori- 
gin” refers to all possible sources of international obligations, that is to say, to 
all processes for creating legal obligations recognized by international law’.139 
The decisive question is thus, whether or not strategic decision-making is a 
process that is recognized as a law-creating process under international law. 
At present, the question of legal consequences resulting from non-compliance 
with cma decisions that are legally binding remains unaccounted for. 
2 Which Question of Legitimacy? 
The approach to international law-making that the Agreement enshrines also 
raises questions relating to legitimacy. This section aims to identify the starting 
point for a broader discussion. This discussion will not question the validity of 
the goal of climate change treaty-making, but rather the procedural changes 
of international law-making that the Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision 
represent. 
Discussion of legitimacy in a legal context is not free from controversy and 
depends on underlying assumptions which originate in different schools of 
thought.140 The difficulties in finding common ground increase considerably 
 
138 Art. 12 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
states: ‘There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that 
State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its 
origin or character’. in UN ilc ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Fifty-Third Session’ (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) gaor 56th Session 
Supp 10. Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning 
the interpretation or application of two agreements concluded on 9 July 1986 between 
the two States and which related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior affair, 
unriaa, vol. xx (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3) 215 (1990); M. Pugh, ‘Legal Aspects of the Rainbow 
Warrior Affair’ (1987) 36 iclq 616. 
139 Ibid., at 55. 
140 A. v. Bogdandy, P. Dann and M. Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public Inter- 
national Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’, in A. v. Bog- 
dandy et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer 
2010), 3, at 8, 20; S. Kadelbach, From International Public Law to Public International Law: 
A Comment on the ‘Public Authority of International Institutions and the ‘Publicness’ of 
their Law, in A. v. Bogdandy et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions (Springer 2010), at 33; R. Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy in International Law from a 
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when viewing legitimacy at the international level from the domestic perspec- 
tive, thereby presuming an organizational framework that simply does not ex- 
ist on the international plane. For this section, legitimacy is understood as an 
abstract legal concept that justifies public authority, because it makes proce- 
dure and outcome of authoritative decisions predictable.141 This involves two 
main factors, firstly, a pre-agreed procedure for producing rules is applied and 
secondly, the outcome does not deviate from already accepted rules and stan- 
dards, unless the procedure allows for such fundamental changes. Procedure 
and outcome are thus inter-dependent and one cannot replace the other in the 
attempt to legitimize authority. 
The very question of legitimacy which the Paris Agreement raises does not 
fit into the ever-evolving debate on the persistent challenges of global gover- 
nance, with questions of accountability of international organizations and 
their legitimacy in international law142 and of different actors in multi-level 
regulatory systems.143 The international regime to combat climate change is 
not an international organization and neither the cop nor the cma represents 
an independent body thereunder. The validity of consent of any State acting 
as a Party on the international level is not at stake either: that continued con- 
sent is present and expressed in the decision-making by the Parties through 
 
 
Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds), 
Legitimacy in Inter

n
P
a
le
t
a
i
s
o
e
n
ch
a
e
l
ck
L
t
a
he
w
un
(
p
S
a
p
ir
r
ed
in
qu
g
o
e
ta
r
ti
2
o
0
n
0
m
8
ar
)
k
,
i
1
n
,
t
a
he
t
s
6
en
.
tence “Public International Law: A Comment on…”. 
141 D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Rö- 
ben, (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008), 1, 309, at 310; with empha- 
sis on the element of predictability, A. Buchanan and R.O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of 
Global Governance’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Röben, (eds), 25; Legitimacy in International 
Law (Springer 2008), T.M. Franck, ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: 
International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium’ (2006) 100 ajil 88, at 91; N. Mac- 
Cormick, Institutions of Law (oup 2007) at 154, J.H.H. Weiler employs the metaphor of 
geology to capture the changing normative concept of legitimacy in international law, 
J.H.H, Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legiti- 
macy’ (2004) 64 ZaöRV 547, at 548. 
142 J.C. Morse and R.O. Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’, in A. Dreher et al. (eds), The 
Review of International Organizations (Springer 2014), available at { 
HYPERLINK 
"https://www.princeton.edu/%7Erkeohane/publications/PublishedC
M.pdf" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.princeton.edu/%7Erkeohane/publications/PublishedC
M.pdf" \h } (last accessed 11 October 2017); N. Roughan, ‘Mind the Gaps: Authority 
and Legality in International Law’ (2016) 27 ejil 329, at 333. 
143 See N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism. The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (oup 
2010), at 16, for the special challenge posed through the contribution of private actors 
in transnational environmental regulation see V. Heyvaert, ‘The Transnationalization of 
Law: Rethinking Law through Transnational Environmental Regulation’ (2016) 4 lse Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers, at 9. 
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the cop or the cma. In accordance with the draft rules of procedure, the cma 
continues to reach decisions by State consent on all matters of substance.144 
Yet still, the proliferation of law-making by strategic decisions questions the 
legitimacy of the law that results from it, because it moves international action 
away from domestic parliamentary control. 
For many States, future law-making under the Agreement disconnects inter- 
national legislation from legislative approval and national political processes 
involving democratically elected institutions. Regardless how international 
law is received at the national level, i.e. whether a monist stance or a dualist 
approach is adopted, only the Paris Agreement and not the Paris Decision will 
be the point of reference as the relevant international law.145 Whether the Paris 
Agreement will then be either directly applicable after ratification or trigger 
the need for national legislation, is a distinctly separate question. Even under 
the theory of strict dualism, as applied for instance in the United Kingdom, 
where national and international law remain separate until the international 
agreement is transposed into national law, only the Agreement will be consid- 
ered as the relevant international law to serve as basis for an Act of Parliament. 
Thus, independent of the theoretical approach to the reception of interna- 
tional law from the domestic perspective, many States employ democratically 
elected institutions to make core decisions nationally and internationally. The 
legitimacy of an international treaty tends to depend on the legislative en- 
dorsement in one way or the other.146 The Paris Agreement confounds this bal- 
ance of powers with a new approach to law-making outside established treaty 
avenues. As a result, legislative approval of an international treaty becomes 
less significant. At the same time, it may be rather difficult to argue that legisla- 
tive approval of the treaty comprehensively authorizes these future decisions 
through a meeting of Parties. 
One could argue that for States that endow their national governments 
with international treaty making power under certain conditions, for instance 
through executive agreements, law-making through decisions affects the Par- 
liament’s role less, at least at a first glance. For instance, under US constitutional 
law, an international treaty requires a two-thirds majority of the Senate if it con- 
tains certain legally binding obligations, Art. 2, § 2 cl. 2 US Constitution. In rela- 
tion to the Paris Agreement, new financial commitments or binding emission 
 
 
144 Art. 16 (5) Paris Agreement: Draft Rules of Procedure, Rule 42, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2. 
145 For the different theories see J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 
(8th edn oup 2012) at 48, 88. 
146 M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Anal- 
ysis’ (2004) 15 ejil 907, at 924. 
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targets would have triggered the need for parliamentary approval in the US.147 
Inclusion of such provisions in a decision outside the Agreement thus avoids 
involving the Senate. This bypasses domestic intervention that could risk the 
feasibility of the Agreement. On the downside, this approach reduces the resil- 
ience of the Agreement against political changes. As a result, abandoning the 
Paris Agreement became a matter to be solely decided by US President Don- 
ald Trump. Even if legislative approval is not needed to bring the international 
agreement into existence as an executive agreement, constitutional arrange- 
ments are nevertheless challenged if substantive issues are included in deci- 
sions, that would have triggered the need for parliamentary debate had they 
been part of the international agreement. 
This outcome-oriented approach to develop the Agreement through decision- 
making by Parties certainly permits, but does not guarantee, speedier regime 
development than treaty amendments involving ratification.148 Effective- 
ness or output legitimacy alone, even if it is coupled with a ‘good cause’, is 
not sufficient to justify authoritative decision-making outside the pre-agreed 
procedure.149 
Regardless of whether parliamentary approval is required, law-making 
through strategic decisions under the Paris Agreement affects the constitu- 
tional arrangements of all Parties and this is the question of legitimacy that 
merits  further exploration. 
 
VI Conclusions 
The Paris Agreement breaks new legal ground in various ways and this article 
has explored in detail its specific approach to law-making that is designed to 
 
147 In accordance with the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 1997, S.Res.98 – A resolution expressing 
the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signa- 
tory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Na- 
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed with 95 votes in favour and no 
vote against it, S. Rept. 105–54, available at {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-
resolution/98" \h } {  HYPERLINK 
"https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-
resolution/98" \h }(last visited 7 June 2018), see also D. Bodansky, ‘The Paris 
Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 ajil 288, 297. 
148 J. Brunnée, ‘International Environmental law and Community Interests: Procedural 
Aspects’ in E. Benvenisti and G. Nolte (eds), Community Interests Across International 
Law (oup 2018), available online {  HYPERLINK 
"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784701" \h }{ 
HYPERLINK 
"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784701" \h 
}(last visited 7 June 2018) at 26. 
149 See R. Falkner, ‘A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Effi- 
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pave the way for future action at the international level to combat climate 
change. Four conclusions resonate from the analysis. First, the Paris Agree- 
ment and the Paris Decision together set forth the regulatory substance of a 
new framework-cum-decisions model that bases mitigation of climate change 
on ndcs by its Parties in combination with a strong normative expectation of 
progression and elements of oversight to steer collective and individual efforts. 
Second, Parties intend to use the cma not only to review progress and imple- 
mentation of the Paris Agreement, but to actively drive Parties’ ambition and 
to make skeletal provisions operational through continuous decision-making. 
The cma defines the content and form of these decisions, which could be le- 
gally binding in international law. Third, this means of creating obligations re- 
quires the governance of the Energy Union to adapt to continuous strategic 
decisions. Fourth, relying on continuous strategic decisions has implications 
for legal certainty and legitimacy of international climate action. 
First. In relation to the regulatory substance agreed in Paris, the Agreement 
for the first time sets a temperature target as a global long-term climate goal, 
and obliges all Parties to aim for the best nationally determined contributions 
available to them. A significant omission is that this is done without defining 
the elements of an ndc. The Agreement strongly relies upon self-perception by 
its Parties, a normative expectation of progression, and peer pressure through 
enhanced transparency and a public register. The global stocktake contains 
elements of a top-down oversight mechanism. The cma has a new oversight 
function to shape this procedure, and the competence to define sources of in- 
put from Parties, to take stock of their collective efforts, and to inform their 
successive ndcs. The cma could drive ambition further through establishing a 
temperature goal close to 1.5°C. Oversight is complemented by expert review, 
with a view of coherent reporting and accounting obligations in accordance 
with cma guidelines for all Parties. Flexibility may be granted, depending on 
the decision of the cma. Besides mitigation, the Agreement recognizes adapta- 
tion as a global goal. Parties also accept that compensation is necessary, where 
mitigation and adaptation efforts prove to be insufficient. The cma carries the 
function of steering Parties towards achieving these goals. The cma will have 
to define how adaptation efforts of developing country Parties are recognized, 
how financial flows will be made predictable and efficiently used, and whether 
the wim may include liability provisions at some point in the future. Likewise, 
decisions on concrete financial support and on compliance and the design of 
the carbon market will be adopted by the cma. 
Second. The Agreement was achieved because it provides the setting for 
a new method to develop a treaty regime, which represents more than just 
a gradual shift. A new framework convention-cum-decisions model emerges 
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from a compromise: the Agreement demonstrates the will of its Parties to 
reduce the risks of climate change, but also the lack of commitment to ac- 
cept obligations in the Agreement itself. As a result, the cma is endowed with 
autonomy to govern the Agreement, and the success of the Agreement will 
depend on its decision-making, not on an additional protocol or treaty amend- 
ments. cma decisions will need to clarify and establish obligations of conduct 
and determine the details of procedural requirements Parties have to fulfil. 
Third. This aspect concerns the external impact of cma decision-making. 
The proposal for the governance of the European Energy Union demonstrates 
that cma decisions will have significant implications for the European Union, 
where it becomes necessary to continuously align its regulations with the 
means and objectives of climate action at the international level. The gover- 
nance of the European Energy Union underpins European climate action with 
the objectives of the agreement and provides explicitly for the reception of fu- 
ture decisions of the cma. As such, European Union legislation will function as 
transmission belt for internationally agreed regulation. cma decisions could 
drive the process of decarbonizing the European economy. If the competences 
of the cma is used efficiently, the Paris Agreement could well become an effec- 
tive instrument to govern decarbonization in the 21st century. 
Fourth. The significant increase in cma decision-making powers results 
from thinning the fabric of the new tablecloth, the Paris Agreement itself. 
While the Paris Agreement relies upon cma decisions to be fully operational, 
the Agreement itself cannot guarantee that these decisions will be adopted, 
and if, when that will be. This alone results in a decrease of legal certainty on 
climate regulation at the international level. Furthermore, leaving substantial 
issues for further decision-making prevents emerging obligations from en- 
trenchment in treaty law. This in turn increases uncertainties in relation to 
the consequences of non-compliance with such decisions. The question of le- 
gitimacy that this article has identified as one that merits further exploration 
concerns the competence gain of the cma and as such, will be more visible 
in a situation where the cma is actually acting. In such a scenario, decision- 
making by the cma does effectively take place and makes the Paris Agreement 
operational, in accordance with the competences assigned to the cma by the 
Paris Agreement and the Paris Decision as outlined throughout this article. 
Considering that these decision could be legally binding, law-making gravi- 
tates towards decisions adopted by national governments through the actions 
of their representatives in the cma. This contravenes constitutional arrange- 
ments of Parties. Law produced outside international agreements diminishes 
the participatory role of national parliaments, a role normally tied to formal 
treaty-making. While parliaments may control the ratification or approval of 
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the Paris Agreement, the accompanying Paris Decision and all further deci- 
sions fall entirely within the prerogative of national governments. In cases 
where these decisions gain an equal legal impact as those in the Agreement 
itself, parliamentary participation might need re-thinking to balance demo- 
cratic participation and ultimately, to make the Paris Agreement the long-term 
success that it needs to be. 
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